

DISCOURSES 2.

UPON THE

Modern Affairs

OF

EUROPE.

Tending to prove, that the Illustrious
FRENCH MONARCHY may be reduced to
terms of greater moderation.

*Di Dendri, di senno, e di Fede,
C'nè manco che non Créde.*

There is commonly less Money, less Wisdom, and less
good Faith than men do account upon. *Verulam.*

*Et digiti pedum, partim sunt ex ferro, & partim ex luto; quia
ex parte regnum futurum est durum, & ex parte futurum est
fragile, Dan. 2. 42.*

Printed in the Year, 1680.

The PUBLISHER to the R E A D E R.

THE Author of these Discourses I know not. But the same coming to my hands, beyond any expectation of mine, I thought I was bound to give the Publick (whose mark is upon them) credit for the same. And because it is one essential property of a good Merchant to pay well, I also thought my self obliged to render the effects of so good a *bit*, into the common Bank, where they are due. It is true, there are some things in them, which seem not so fit for publick view; but those things concerning the *Author* and not *me*, who have a stock only going in the publick Company, and am no private Trader; I pass those considerations over, seeing good things (as the *Philosopher* long since observed) the more common, the better they are. And he that cannot speak within doors, may sometimes take liberty to speak without doors, especially when those within doors seem to forget the most material points. Something I would also say of the Discourse it self; but because it is a Proverb as old as *Apelles* himself its Author, *That the Shoemaker must not go above his Last*: I will pray in aid of my Lord *Bacon*, and desire him to be of Counsel for me. And first, for the method and manner of handling, thus he speaks, *The form of writing which best agrees with so variable and universal an argument (as is the handling of Negotiations and scatter'd Occasions) that would be of all other the fittest which Machiavil made choice of, for the handling of matters of Policy and Government; namely, by Observations and Discourses, as they term them, upon History and Examples.* For knowledge drawn freshly, and, as it were in our view, out of Particulars, knows the way best to Particulars again; and it hath much the greater life for Practice, when the Discourse or Discepration attends upon the Example, than when the Example attends upon the Discepration: for here not only order but substance is respected. And as to the *matter*, who would not but be in a passion, to see the world undone by insufficient Counsellors? or, to speak in our own Dialect, so many good Ships lost, as it were, in the very mouth of the Haven, through unskilful Pilots? And to see fighting Armies neglected, and impertinent things relied on? Let him therefore speak to these two things. To the first. The speech of *Themistocles*, taken to himself, was indeed somewhat uncivil and haughty; but if it had been applied to others, and at large, certainly it may seem to comprehend in it a wise Observation and a grave Censure. Desired at a Feast to touch a Lute, he said, he could not *Fiddle*, but yet he could make a *small Town a great City*. These words drawn to a politic sense do excellently expresse and distinguish two differing abilities, in those that deal in business of Estate. For if a true Survey be taken of all Counsellors and States-men that ever were, and others promoted to publick charge, there will be found (though very rarely) those which can make a *small State great*, and yet cannot *Fiddle*: as on the other side there will be found a great many, that are very cunning upon the *Circumstances* (that is in *Court-Tricks*) but yet are so far from being able to make a *small State great*, as their gifts lies another way, to bring a *Glorious and Flourishing Estate to Ruine and Decay*. To the second thus. *Walled Towns, stored Arcenals and Armories, goodly races of Horse, Chariots of War, Elephants, Ordinance, Artillery, and the like; all this is but a Sheep in a Lions skin, except the breed and disposition of the People be stout and Warlike.* Nay number it self in Armies imports not much, where the people is of a faint and weak courage. For, as *Virgil* saith, *It never troubles a Wolf, how many the Sheep are.* And a little after, *A man may rightly make a judgment, and set it down for a sure and certain truth, that the principal point of all other which respects the Greatness of any Kingdom or State, is to have a RACE of Military men.* *Forrevel.*

DISCOURSES, &c.

Chap. I.

THe great thing which has disturbed the Peace of Europe, filled it with blood and slaughters, and shaken the dismembred Kingdoms and States thereof, has been the huge designe of the *Universal Monarchy*; a designe which (by a kind of Fascination) has possessed the Genius of the Spanish and French Monarchies, which therefore, in their turns, have been dangerous to all Europe. But the French have made nearer approaches to the Throne of such extended Empire than the Spaniards. Let us then look upon the means and advantages, the most Christian King has, to pursue so vast a designe, as if he would plow up the Air) To the end our minds may be stirred up, (if any thing will stir them; to raise up those Banks, which (under that Providence, to which, nothing is so high, to be above it; nothing so low, to be beneath it; nothing so large, but is bounded; nor, nothing so confused, but is ordered by it.) will circumscribe such wild and boundless ambition, within its own limits.

And for our encouragement, let us by the way, hear the judgment of that excellent Man, *Sr. Walter Ralegh*, in the case of the Spanish Monarchy, which then was, what France now is, to the rest of Europe. His words are these. Since the fall of the Roman Empire (omitting that of the Germans, which had neither greatness nor continuance) there hath been no State fearful in the *East*, but that of the *Turk*; nor in the *West* any Prince that hath spread his Wings far over his nest, but the *Spaniard*; who since the time that *Ferdinand* expelled the Moores out of Granada, have made many attempts to make themselves Masters of all Europe. And it is true, that by the treasures of both Indies, and by the many Kingdoms which they possess in Europe, they are at this day the most powerful. But as the *Turk* is now counterpoised by the *Persian*, so instead of so many millions as have been spent by the English, French, and Neatherlands in a defensive War, and in diversions against,

them, it is easie to demonstrate, that with the charge of two hundred thousand pound, continued but for two yeares or three at the most, they may not only be perswaded to live in peace, but all their swelling and overflowing streams, may be brought back into their natural Channels and old Banks. But to go on.

France then is come to the greatest perfection in respect of Domestic Empire it is capable of. For 1. whereas heretofore the body of that Kingdom was not intire, but subject to severall great Barons, who were able not only to expostulate, but to contend with the King, the are all brought now to a dependence on the Crown, and becom most obsequious to it. And besides, many of the richest and most potent of them are of the blood Royal; so that upon the failer of those who are before them, they, or their posteritie may succed to the Crown, which keeps them firm to it. 2. All those mighty members into which that Kingdom was formerly divided, are now annexed to the Crown: So that for largeness of Territory, and compacted and united strength, it is becom the most formidable Kingdom in all Europe. And as by the former of these, they have secured themselves against all intestine Wars, which many times through the interests and feuds of those Barons, shook the whole Frame of that Kingdom; So, by the latter, they have fenced themselves against all Forreign invasion. For heretofore all the neighbouring Princes were ready upon every occasion to invade the Kingdom of France, The Dukes of Burgundy, Britannie, Guienne or Flanders, being alwayes tempting them thereunto, and giving them access, passage, and reception. By this means England made two Conquests of France, and at other times forced them to buy Peace of them, and pay them tribute. But now whosoever would invade that Kingdom, shall not only want these for their confederates to invite and assist them, but shall have them for their enemies. Thus far *Machiavel* has observed for substance. 3. By abrogating the Convention of Estates, that King has spoyled the people of that power and share in Government, which they have originally had in all the mixt Monarchies of Europe, and made himself absolute even in the point of raising money, which is the blood that fills the veins of that mighty Body. By this means he has changed the constitution of that Kingdom, from mixed to absolute Monarchy for the kind of it; which is the Form that inables a Prince

Prince to do most mischief bot at home and abroad. 4. But that which is the Crown of this perfection, and may be the strongest stay of it, is the Naval force now added to the other strengths of that powerful Monarchy, wherein it now equals, if it be not an overballance to, either England or Holland. For this is a maxim; That the power of a Prince whose Dominions border on the Sea, cannot be perfect without a force in Shipping able to command the Sea. Wherefore in my opinion (which nevertheless is exceeding weak) one of the greatest mischiefs this War has produced, is, That it has given occasion to France to become mighty in Naval power. And that mischief can never better be demonstrated then by this consideration: That there was never before any example upon Earth of a Triumvirate of mighty Nations in a vicinity of neighbourhood one to another, and bordering upon the same Seas, equally powerful in Naval strength. The consequence of which must of necessity in time to come, be, a perpetual emulation and jealousy, greater, by how much either an Union or division of three is more perfect then of any other number. Whereby it must necessarily come to pass, either that some two of the three shall alternatly, or by turns fight against the third; Or that two of the three shall agree to extinguish the power of the third, that themselves may remain in indifferent terms, without jealousy one of another. It is now long since France wanted but one of three things to help them to drive on that huge designe of ambition for the universal Monarchy, which has so long swelled their hearts. To bring Holland under a kind of feudal protection of that Crown, by which means they might serve themselves of their Ships and Seamen: Or to make themselves masters of the Spanish Netherlands: Or lastly to grow great in Naval strength at home. For France has been dangerous enough to the rest of Europe, whilst they were in a manner without Shipping: Inasmuch that those two things were observed of them in the time of *Queen Elizabeth*; That France could never abstain from War for above two or three years together; And that they could never be poor. 5. and lastly, To all these may be added the new Conquests and acquisitions of the French. But nevertheless it may be doubted, whether that Monarchy has received any real accession of strength by those Conquests, in case it should come to feel the shock of a powerful and vigorous Enemy. It is true indeed (what *Machiavel* has said) That the Conquests of Com-

„non-wealths that are ill Governed, and contrary to the Model of the
 „Romans, do conduce more to the ruin, then advancement of their af-
 fairs. But when we shall a little penetrate (what he elsewhere sayes)
 That when we have observed the Histories of former times, we shall
 find, that Common-wealths had generally but three wayes of enlarging
 their Empire. One is that which was observed by the *Tuscan*s of old,
 who entered into a League of Confederacy with severall other Common-
 wealths, with condition of equality, that no particular should have any
 degree or authority above the rest, and that comprehension should be
 left for all their new Conquests to com in, not much unlike the practice
 of the *Swissers* and the *Hollanders* of late, and the *Achaïans* and *Aeo-
 lians* of old. Another way of extending your Empire, is, by affociating
 with severall Cities, but so, as that the dignitie of the Command,
 the seat of the Empire, and the honour of the enterprize may remain
 with you, which was the way observed by the *Romans*, and it was pe-
 culiar to them; no other people has observed it, and certainly no bet-
 ter is to be found. The third is the way of the *Spartans*, and *Athenians*,
 who entertained no Confederates, but whatever Territories they con-
 quered, they annexed them to their own. Which way is undoubtedly
 the worst of the three, as appeared by the two said Republicks, who
 were ruined upon no other accompt, but because they had grasped more
 Dominion then they were able to hold. I say, these things distinctly
 considered, and the last way being that which the French practice in their
 Conquests, it makes the doubt yet greater.

From that of the State, if we descend to the consideration of the
 person of the King, it gives us these two momentuous Observations.
 1. It shewes us how necessary a thing it is for a Prince that would either
 defend or enlarge his State, to excel in practical Wisdom, which con-
 sists in application, conduct and pursuit. For by that meanes he
 shall always be served of wise and excellent men. For it ever was,
 and ever will be true; as the Prince himself is, so are his Counsel,
 and those that are about him. A weak Prince will never endure wise
 men; nor can wise men ever be safe under an inadvertent Prince.
 And it gives him mighty advantages over the Princes and States that are
 about him; especially if their administrations be slow, weak, and re-
 miss. And it is commonly seen when a great man rises in the World,
 either

either that he is alone, or that the magnificence of his actions swallow up the weaker efforts of others, as the Sea does the Rivers. And secondly, That when a wise and Martial Prince rises, and is succeeded by one or two Princes of equal condition to himself, without a pusillanimous interposed, they may do very great things in the world; since the succession of two such Princes alone, *Philip* and *Alexander*, in the Kingdom of *Macedon* was sufficient to Conquer the World. I conclude therefore, That if the present King of *France* should be succeeded by a Prince of equal Vertue to himself, they would swallow up the greatest part of Europe. But because the great things of a Monarchy begin and end with one or a few Princes; and it is rarely seen, that three sufficient Princes immediately succeed one another, without some effeminate or ill-consulted Prince between, I am of opinion, that Monarchy will sink with its own weight.

Now having taken a view of the force and strength of this Monarchy, and the sufficiency of her present King, let us next consider what their next attempts are like to be. In general they will do these two things, What they begun by War, they will pursue in Peace: for they had no other design in making Peace, than to disarm their Enemies, break their Confederation, and hinder *England* from coming into it, that they might insult over the world, by a Peace more tyrannical than the War of a Gallant Enemy. And then when the injured World can bear their insolencies no longer, out of the elements of this Peace they will raise up a new War. For that Prince that would make great Conquests, must make short Wars, and renew them often. *Holland* they will not attack, at least not this year, for two important reasons. Because *Flanders* lies between that and *France*. And besides, they will go as softly as they can, till towards the latter end of the Summer, for fear of awaking them out of that sleep, their wasted Spirits, and trading Humour have cast them into. And *England* their stomachs do not serve them to meddle with. For though it be true that whosoever he be, that shall attempt to set up an Universal Monarchy in Europe, will first or last find *England* the strongest bar in the way; I say *England*, which is not only the strongest, but now the only strong Kingdom that is in Europe, next to *France*. And therefore *Philip II.* of *Spain*, after all his vain attempts and pursuit, turned himself upon
England;

England; in which though he miscarried, yet he maintained a long War in *Ireland*. Yet the French will think to serve themselves of the supine negligence of *England*; and still hope that they may have Protractions there for their money, till they have rased up the rest of Europe; as they eat bread. And besides, they will find a better way to distress *England*; and more effectual than by any point blank attaque which they can make upon it, as we shall see anon. Lastly, there is yet one very important reason, and that is, they are afraid of *England*; and truly, if God had not placed in man the irascible affection of fear, he would be much a wilder creature than he is. But lest the truth of this should be doubted, it will not be amiss to call a foreign Witness, and that is *Machiavel*, whose own words are: "The French are in great fear of the English, for the great inroads and devastations which they have made anciently in that Kingdom; insomuch that among the common people the name of English is terrible to this day: But he adds, "There was not then the same reason for it. It is true, there are not so strong reasons why they should fear us so much now, as they did formerly, our advantages which we had over that Kingdom being most of them lost, and that Monarchy come to its full strength, and the greatest perfection it is ever like to see. And yet there be very strong reasons why they should yet fear us, and if they do not apprehend them, it is no bodily fault but our own. And I say, that both the Spanish and French Monarchies inherit such a remembrance of the English as the Romans did of *Hannibal*. Nay, I think it may be truly affirmed, That *France* is more afraid of the *Parliament* of *England* (that is, the King and the Estates of Parliament, for they are all comprehended under the word Parliament) than of any one, if not of all the Princes and States of Europe.

But if *France* will do neither of these, what is it then that they will do? I answer, We must not take our measures by those reports they cause to be given out up and down the world, to cast a mist before the eyes of their Neighbour-Princes and States as Jugglers do; nor when they seem to look far abroad must we regard it; but consider by the exact Rules of Prudence, what is fit for them to do, and what we our selves would do, were we in their case. I say then, that the greatest and wisest thing which *France* can do next, is to make himself master of the residue

of the Spanish Netherlands, and particularly to seize upon Ostend and Newport. And when he has don that, to turn his whole force upon the Empire, not omitting in the meane time to attempt all that he can do there, as well to amuze and divert them, as to open his way to the compleat Conquest of that branch of the miserable house of *Austria*.

To demonstrate this, I know no better way, then a little to consider, and discourse upon the consequences of this, with respect unto *England* and *Holland*. For *England*. If the French be permitted to become masters of the Spanish Netherlands, and to possess *Ostend* and *Newport*, then *England* will not only not have a footing on the Main, but all the Sea-coast opposite to the whole body of it will be in the hands of the French, always Enemies to *England* in Interest and Humour. And if he pleases to look over the Sea, he may seize upon *Ireland* when he pleases, which will always lie open to him, and where he will find Papists enough to entertain and joyn with him. And let it be remembered, that *Ireland* is in a manner already cut off from *England* by the Irish Act. And what would *England* then be, but an Island hemm'd in by the Sea, and their Enemy its master, and shut out of the world? By this means they will be precluded from sending any succours to the rescue or relief of those Provinces. And by this means also it must necessarily come to pass (which is worst of all) that *England* must lose both the Dominion of the Sea, and their Trade; and in time will not be able either to build or sail Ships out of their own Ports, without the License of *France*, And so will be in a fair way to become a Feudal Province of *France*. And thus we see *England* may be distressed without warring directly upon it. It is the greatest blemish in the Reign of *Henry* the Seventh, (celebrated in our Histories for one of the wisest of all our Princes) that he suffered *Britany* to be lost, and annexed to the Crown of *France*; a foul spot in so beautiful a Picture, as he is taken by the Pencil of my Lord Bacon. And the more I think of these things, the more I am confirmed, that we shall stir up the just indignation of those that are to come after us, against our memories; and it will be the wonder of succeeding Generations, that so great a King as the King of *England*; in a War that had for its ends an Universal Monarchy for the most Christian King, and the subversion of the Protestant Religion and Interest; The one as foolishh and impossible to be effected, as the other is full of monstrous and detestable

testable impiety towards God, And to which ends our Enemies have been travelling through a Sea of Blood, and all those crooked ways the first attempter against God, beat out to those that travel with Pride, Ambition, and Impiety: I say, that such a King, in such a War, and such a Peace as followed it, should sit still, and suffer himself to be (as it were) besieged in his own Kingdom, whilst he suffered *France*, not only to grow to an over-balance to *England* in Naval force, but to plant himself all along on the opposite shore of the main Continent, and in the mean time to suffer the greatest part of *Europe* to be consumed with the flames of an unjust War, and be sacrificed to the ambition of *France*. An aggravation greater, by how much *England* has been famous for holding and casting the Balance of Europe, and protection of the Protestant Religion. Since therefore it is a royal virtue in Kings, not only to avoid Flatterers as a Pest, but to encourage some body to tell them the truth roundly, still preserving the dignity of their persons, and the majesty of their state; I think a man cannot do better than to bring things home to them: for if Princes would but a little reflect, and look back upon the times past, where they might see the beauty that is upon the memory of good Princes, and the deformity of that of the bad, they would see the excellency of plain dealing, and the odiousness of pernicious flattery.

For *Holland*. It will be enough to say, That if they suffer the *Spanish Netherlands* to be lost, *France* will not only claim, by a Title prior to theirs, all the Conquests and Dominions of this State in *Flanders* and *Brabant*, but may set up the Title of the House of *Burgundy* to the whole Seventeen Provinces: and finally, that they will have a very bad Neighbour.

I conclude therefore, That it is the interest of *England* and *Holland*, by all means, not only to preserve the rest of the *Spanish Netherlands* from falling into the hands of *France*, but to make him vomit up what he has already swallowed of them. For besides what I have already said, If *France* once becomes master of those Provinces, *Holland* and the rest of the Provinces of the League will become an easie and cheap prey to him, which concerns *England* not a little in point of Interest. And to keep those Netherlands in the hands of *Spain*, is, (I think) more the advantage of *England* and *Holland*, than it is of *Spain* it self.

For

For of *Spain* we are secure, because he is weak, at that distance, and neither will, nor can inroach upon his Neighbours: and so we preserve the greatest Bank of security to both, against the Inundations of *France*.

To conclude this part, For the most *Christian King*, we are no doubt to look upon him as the minister of Gods indignation, howbeit he meaneth not so, but has done all these things in pride and cruelty, and attributed their success to his strength and wisdom: For the power both of Satan and wicked Kings is from God, but the will and malice is their own. Therefore the French King has made use of all these powers and advantages to do evil; evil I say, than which the most merciless Tyrants, and destroyers of the earth (whom God has said he will destroy) have not in any the most barbarous age of the world, committed greater, or more crying to the righteous God for vengeance. And a Prince affected with so vast and wild ambition, is to be looked on as an enemy to mankind, as a proud attempter to destroy the bounds which God has set. And therefore if so excellent hope, that God will stop the way against our enemies, if we return to him; if the preservation of the true Religion; the liberties of our Countreys; the great interests of mankind; or whatsoever other excellent consideration we can propose to our minds will move us, let us behave our selves like men, and do some great thing worthy our remembrance.

And this brings me to the second part of my discourse. In the first we have seen the mischiefs, let us now consider of the remedies.

Now because there is no separate Kingdom or State in Europe sufficient to ballance the weighty Body of the French Monarchy, nor any of their strengths in disjunction, competent to be opposed against so formidable force; therefore there must be a new fond of Power and Interest raised up, sufficient to keep the ballance of Europe from being called back into a *Chaos*, out of which the French may form an *Universal Monarchy*, according to the *Idea* they have conceived thereof.

And this can by no means better be done than by *England* and the *United Provinces*, entring into a *new League*, for the mutual and reciprocal defence of themselves, and their Confederates, that shall be admitted into such League, and for preservation and defence of the *Spanish Netherlands*; and for restraining the further growth and increase of the *French Monarchy*, and hindering their inroachments upon the rest

of Europe. The excellency of which *League* will appear by this; That the ends of it are in a manner common to all Europe: For though the preservation of the Protestant Religion be most the concernment of *England* and *Holland*, yet the special and immediate end of the preservation of *Flanders*, and the general end of holding the Ballance of Europe is *Universal*.

Upon occasion of the beginning of the War between the Latins and the Romans, *Machiavil* has delivered this Rule; 'That in all Consultations, it is best to come immediately to the point in question, and bring things to a result, without too tedious a hesitation and suspense. And the reason of this is founded upon divers observations which he gathers out of several parts of the Roman Story: as, 'That weak Commonwealths are generally irresolute, and ill advised, as taking their measures more from necessity than election: That 'tis the property of weak States to do every thing amiss, and never to do well but in spite of their teeth; for there is no such thing as prudence amongst them: 'That weak and irresolute States, do seldom take good Counsels, unless they be forced; for their weakness suffers them not to deliberate, where any thing is doubtful; and if that doubt be not removed by a violent necessity, they never come to a resolution, but are always in suspense: And that it is a fault peculiar to all weak and improvident Princes and Governments to be slow and tedious, as well as uncertain in their Counsels, which is as dangerous as the other. With divers more of the like nature. Wherefore there may seem to be but one thing that may perplex us, and that is, Whether this course may sort to the nature of the times and our circumstances? Touching this point the same Author gives this Rule, 'That the occasion of every mans good or bad fortune consists in his correspondence & accommodation with the times. The wary course that *Fabius* took against *Hannibal* was good, because the times and the condition of the Romans suited to it: But had the same course been holden on when *Scipio* undertook the War, *Hannibal* might have staid in *Italy*; but the times being changed, they also altered the method of the War. And it is certainly true, That to every purpose there is a time and a judgment, therefore the misery of man is great upon him, because the time is hard to be discerned: for, if the time be missed, things cannot succeed: for man knoweth not his time. If a man chuses a wrong time

time, he may labour and travel, nor only in vain as to the issues designed, but may bring forth his own destruction; for the universal influence and concurrence of the first Providence is wanting. But when we shall seriously consider, that there is no other way left; that the French King will neither be quiet himself, nor let any body else alone; and that we must either throw up the Cudgels, and let him domineer as he pleases, or do something that may either deter him from attempting further, or if he does, may shew him there is as good iron in the world as any he has in *France*. I say, things being thus, I can foresee no objection of weight against the proposition. That State that will defend it self, must be in a condition to offend its enemies. And so long as this *State* shall give occasion to *France* to apprehend that they are afraid of him, he will use them as Dogs.

Therefore since *this* is like to be a *League* of as great importance as has been made in the world a good while, to render the same secure to the parties; to add majesty and grandeur to it; to render it more sacred; and to give it weight and reputation in the world; it will be necessary, that *the same* be approved, ratified, and confirmed both by the *Parliament of England*, and the *General Estates of the Seven Provinces*, in an extraordinary Assembly. I confess the thing is both very extraordinary and magnificent, and will make the times famous. But the arguments that enforce the necessity thereof are irrefragible; the demonstration whereof I shall leave this whole discourse, and the dignity and weight of the matters themselves, to give evidence unto: and I shall say no more in this place, Than that there is nothing that Princes and States may more justly value themselves upon, than Faith and Sincerity, in their Leagues, and Treaties, and Negotiations with other Princes and States: and insincerity or State-hypocrisy less becomes the majesty of State, than it does private persons in moral and civil actions.

But before we go any further, it will be but necessary to answer an Objection that may be made on the part of England, and that is, That to confirm a *League* by the *Parliament*, will weaken the *Kings Prerogative*. To which I answer 1. *Ad hominem*; That which has been done in the time of former Kings, and those the greatest and wisest of our Princes, and did not lessen their *Prerogative*; may be done again without weakening the *Prerogative* of the present King. But this thing has been

often don in former Parliaments, as our Rolles of Parliament, Records, Law Books and Histories shew. But I shall content my self to name two or three of the most Principal, as sufficient.

A League and Alliance was made between King *Henry 5.* his Heires and Successors, and *Sigismund King of the Romans* his Heires and Successors Kings of the Romans, and was confirmed by A^t of Parliament. *Coke Inst.* pars 4. 156. Rot. Parl. 4. H. 5. No^r 14.

That illustrious Peace, 9. H. 5. made between *Charles* the 6. of France, and the said *Henry 5.* of England (who was the very *Alexander* of the Kings of England for magnificence) by which the King of England had confirmed to him the Regency of the Kingdom of France during the life of *Charles*, and the succession of the Crown after his death, was ratified by the three Estates of France, and sworn to by the *King of England in Parliament*, and by the same Parliament ratified.

And 11. *Henry 7.* the same case happened again. The three States of the Kingdom joyned with the King in the ratification of a Peace with France in the same manner. This King was a Prince of great wisdom and sufficiency (as I said before); He invaded France with a Royal Army, made them buy a Peace of him, and pay him *Tribute*, which continued yet in the times of *Henry 8.* his Son; nevertheless he ratified a Peace by the *Parliament*. So you see *two Kings*, one the greatest Conqueror, as the other was the greatest Politician of the Kings of England, *ratifying their Leagues* (which nevertheless they purchased with their own swords) by *Parliaments*.

And so sacred were our Leagues and Truces held to be in those times, that 2. H. 5. c. 6. It was enacted by Parliament, *That the breaking of Truces should be High Treason in the subjects of England.*

But 2. I answer *ad Rem*; It is said the Kings Prerogative is to make War and Peace. If the King then make a League, and the Parliament confirm that League, it is so far from lessening that it confirms that Authority.

That there must be a *New League*, and that it must have not only more, but larger dimensions, then the present League in being, is evident: Because the House of Commons in the late long Parliament voted, *That the League offensive and defensive, between his Majesty and this State, is not according to their Advices given to his Majesty,*
nor

nor pursuant to the ends by them proposed. Which vote has blasted the present League : And if you should call twenty Parliaments, they would all be of the same opinion.

And because all humane Providence is short-sighted, there may be a provisional clause added ; That where the ordinary provisions and remedies of this League shall fall short or disproportionate, the Parliament shall be called to deliberate of supplemental complements of provisions, that may be adequate to the force that shall attack the League ; which will yet add both strength and reputation to it.

But not to enter into Common-place discourses, I will insist upon but one thing more in this place, and it is this : There is a Rule which *Machiavel* has observed, That the best and most secure way to repress the insolence of an ambitious and powerful State, is to preclude and stop up those ways by which he would come to his greatness : and that there is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence, or *cross-bite* the designs of such, then to take the same ways to prevent, which he takes to advance them. Now then, I think it would be of great advantage to this League (as every body may easily apprehend) to put *Ostend and Neuport* into the hands of *England*. And if *Spain* will suffer themselves to hear reason, and be persuaded to do it, I am without all doubts, a way may be found how they may do it with infallible security to themselves, of having the said places restored to them, so that their end may be obtained, and their hazard prevented.

Having now spoken to that part of the *Parliaments confirmation*, I shall discourse, and that very briefly, the other part of the ratification by the *General Estates* ; and the more willingly, because I think it may import this State in a double respect. And I have conceived it thus. The prescience, predetermination and concurrence of God, none denies, tho all have not conceived of them in the same *modus*. But the Politician has said, That 'tis a certain truth, that the things of this world are determined, and a set time appointed for their duration ; but those run throw the whole course which is assigned them by their Stars, who keep their body in such Order, that it may not alter at all, or if it does, it is for the better. And the way to preserve such Bodies (*mixt bodies*, he speaks of, *as Common-wealths*) is renovation : for no mere bodies are of long duration, unless they be often renewed ; and the way to renew them

them is to reduce them to their first principles; and they are reduced partly by external accident, and partly by internal prudence. Those alterations are therefore salutiferous, which reduce them towards their principles. But my designe is not to enter into the common-place of renovation, *therefore I go on.* And since it is in the nature of all things to decline, and tend to depravation; It is the wisdom of Governments to look often back to their first constitutions, which are the very *Formalis Ratio*, and Fundamental Laws of their Governments. Therefore let the General Estates of the seven Provinces be summoned to meet in the great *Zael* in the *Hage*, to these two general ends. 1. To renew their Common-League among themselves, which will have these two admirable effects: First to cure their internal disease, and especially that kind of Politic *Paralysis* of the two Provinces of *Groeningen* and *Friesland*, which tends to mutilation. Secondly to restore a kind of new life and vigour to their Government. No Government can live, that has not extraordinary remedies to have recourse to in extraordinary cases: *Rome* had its *Dictators*, which kept it in health; and *England* has its *Parliament*, without which its Government could not stand. For this cause has our Parliaments so often renewed our *Magna Charta*; neare *forty times*. And 2. to ratifie this *League* with *England*: For as the first defends them against internal diseases; So this against external Force; the two diseases of which all Governments die. And this will also give reputation abroad to the States thus recreated and fenced: And if there be any other Argument necessary to inforce the proposition, it may be drawn from the nature of the Government it self. There are in Story and Politics, but three Divisions of Common-wealths. First, They are either *Single*, as *Athens*, *Lacedemons*, &c. Or by *Leagues*, as the *Achaians*, *Etolians*, *Switz*, and the *States*. Secondly they are divided, into such as are for preservation, as *Lacedemon* and *Venice*; or for encrease, as *Athens* and *Rome*. Or thirdly, Into *Equal* and *unequal* in *Libration*. This is a Government of a League, and for preservation only, and very unequal; which whosoever shall thorowly penetrate, shall find cause to apprehend the weight of this proposition: for such another War would shake the States in pieces. And there are but one of three wayes for them; War; Submission to France; or a League with England.

And if there were time, I think a man should not feare to want either
matter

matter or words, to set home the Argument. They are now but newly delivered from the most dangerous *Crisis* that ever their State passed under since its first formation; wherein they have laboured under, not only very dangerous domestic Convulsions, but the powerful assaults of Forreign force. And therefore what Physician that is not a Mountebank, would not prescribe some potent restorative in such case?

I have now but two things to do, to finish this second part of my discourse. The one is to set down some the just praises of the English Nation, to the end these people may be moved to rely upon their friendship with the greater confidence. And I would have don it elaboratly, but that my discourse has already drawn it self out to so great a length. The other is, The admirable effect that will be produced by oposeing the *English courage* to the *French fierceness*. Let us then but run them over.

The English have alwayes been sincere in their Leagues, Alliances, and Treaties. I know presently what will be cast in our teeth, and that is the infamous breach of the *Triple League*. But as he shall alwayes be very far from making a true judgment, that shall determin upon one or a few single actions; so nothing can be more injurious then to impeach the Faith of a gallant Nation, for that which no body have regreted more then themselves. The Philosopher has said, that actions denominate not the subject to be such. And it is true in Divinity, That a man is not to be judged by a few, or many single actions; but by the course and tenor of his life. I say then, that the excellent virtue of faithfulness, has been the general tenor of the English in all times. Let not so foul an indignitie therefore be charged on them; but let the crime lye at the doors of those few men who were the Authors and Counselors of it. And in the mean time I will comfort my self with this hope, that when the Sanction of our Parliament shall come to be put upon this League, his Majesty and the whole Nation with him, will be restored to the good opinion of all whose interest it is not to believe lies. And let me say this, that I have not found in Story any nation to be prefer'd to them for the above mentioned excellent qualitie; wherein I may affirm that they have exceeded the *Romans* themselves: For the Romans passionately affecting an Universal Sovereigntie and Dominion, were not seldom constrained shamefully to prevaricate, to make strained constructions

of their Leagues, to violate their Faith, and to pass over all whatsoever respects of honour, to travel to the ends of their ambition. Whereas the *English* never can have any interest to propogate their *Empire* upon the body of Europe beyond those bounds, which God by nature (his instrument) prescribed to them: The most they pretend to is, to be *Arbiters* between the Princes and States of Europe, as we may see in the example of *Henry 8.* who living in an active time, when three such great spirited Princes met, as *himself*, *Charles V.* and *Francis I.* of *France*, might have made his own markets; yet fought no more than to keep the Ballance equal between those two. *England* then, in Peace, has been famous for the excellent vertue of loyalty and faithfulness: and in all times for keeping close to that *righteous Maxim* of holding the Ballance of Europe steady: a *Maxim* they took up above six hundred years ago. In War they have been renowned for their courage, redoubted strength, and great atchievements. In a word, in War they have been just, as well as valiant; in Peace kind, and in both sincere. And for the profession of the true Religion (without which all other things are either nothing, or as good as nothing) they have been celebrated above all the Nations of Europe. It began there early, and continued in the worst of times: and since the Reformation, her *Divines* has been the most learned and pious of the Christian world; as all *Forreign Divines* will be ready to testifie. These methinks should be powerful encouragements to this *State* to joyn with *England*. *England*, in whom the publick vertue of true meaning, is inherent: from whom both in Peace and War we may expect not only Justice, but even generous goodness (to allude to the most ancient distinction of the Jews:) and who against all other Nations are zealous against Popery.

But that it may appear we do not lay our stresse upon general and rhetorical discourses, there are other considerations of a more particular nature, which must not be passed over. *England* has been the principal instrument of saving this *State* twice from destruction; once in the Infancy of their Common-wealth, in the time of *Queen Elizabeth*, against the *Spaniard*; and now again in the late War, from the *French*. Again, nothing can secure this *State* for the future, against the mischiefs impending from *France*, but the friendship of *England*. And that *England*, in conjunction with this *State*, is able to ballance the *French Monarchy*, I shall

shall thus demonstrate. *France* is larger than *England*, but *England* will always afford more *Souldiers* than *France*, I mean *Foot*: and the strength of all Armies consists in the Infantry. The reasons of this are these two.

1. The division of the people. In *France*, and generally in all other Countreys, there are but two divisions of the people, the *Nobles* and the *Peasants*; but in *England* we have three. 1. The *Nobles*, that is the *Nobility and Gentry*, competent to furnish a sufficient Cavalry. 2. The *Yeomanry*, or middle sort of people, which make up the great Body of the Kingdom, and who are sufficient to furnish the greatest and strongest Infantry of any Kingdom or State in the Christian world. And 3. the *inferior sort* or Servants; I mean such as work for day-wages, which are very inconsiderable in number to the *Yeomanry*. The division of the people is one of the principal foundations of Empire: and the division of the people in *England*, being the best and most perfect of any other in all Europe, it must necessarily follow, that *England* is capable to endure stronger shocks than any other Kingdom or State, founded upon the same ballance of Government, and is the most perfect Government of its kind in Europe.
2. In *England*, the People, that is, the inferior *Gentry* and *Yeomanry* are an over-balance, both to the King, Nobility, and Church, which is a defect in Monarchy, and tends to the generation of a Commonwealth. In *France* and *Spain*, the King and the Nobility have destroyed the People; but in *England* the King and the People have destroyed the Nobility. I say then the strength of the Kingdom of *England* is in the inferior *Gentry* and *Yeomanry*, and these exceeding all other Kingdoms in number, strength, and courage, it must needs follow if the business should come to be tried, where blows must decide, that *England* would be found an over-match even to *France* it self, if Demonstration be Demonstration. But the cause and occasion how these two things come to be so, that is, why the Nobility of *England* are so depressed, and the people become so formidable; as you may see they are, if you look but upon the House of Lords, and the House of Commons, in our present Parliaments. I say, the cause is, those popular Statutes of *Population*, against retainers of the Nobility, and for *Alienations* of their Lands, made by *Henry 7.* (the *Romulus* of the English Kings) which shews the unweariness of that politick King, who in seeking to cure that dangerous flaw in the Government, of the *Nobility* being an over-match

to the *Prince*, made a far greater, of making the *Commons* formidable: for the one strikes only at a *King* they dislike, the other at the *Throne* it self; although it be true those effects came not to manifest themselves, till above one hundred years after his death. Therefore a wise Prince indeed he was, but not long-sighted.

To the second. The French have beaten and baffled the greatest part of the Christian world without fighting, and have opprest them at their own charge. But if ever they should come to deal with an Enemy that would force them to fight, they would shew themselves to be *Frenchmen*, that is, would suffer themselves to be perswaded to submit to more reasonable terms.

If you look upon the carriage of this whole War, you may presently see, that the wisest thing which the French thought they could do, was ever to avoid fighting, supposing surely, that therein they imitated the wisdom of *Fabius Maximus*. But this is most certain (as the discourses upon *Livy* proves) That a General who desires to keep the Field, cannot avoid fighting when the Enemy presses, and makes it his business to engage him. For in such case there are but one of three ways. The first is the way of *Fabius*, of standing upon your guard, and keeping your Army in places of Advantage, and this is laudable and good, when your Army is so strong that the Enemy dares not attack you, as it was in the case of *Fabius* and *Hannibal*: for if *Hannibal* had advanced, *Fabius* would have kept his ground and engaged him. The second way to avoid fighting, if your Enemy will needs attack you, is flying, and fight or fly you must. *Philip of Macedon* being invaded by the *Romans*, resolved not to come to a Battle; and to avoid it, he took the way of *Fabius*, encamped his Army upon the top of a Mountain, and intrenched himself so strongly, that he believed the *Romans* durst not have ventured to come at him. But alas, the *Romans* were another kind of Enemy, they not only adventured, but removed him from his Mountain, and forced him to fly with the greatest part of his Army; and had it not been for the unpassableness of the Country which hindered the pursuit, the *Macedonians* had all been cut off. The *French* were strongly encamped at *St. Dennis*, and did not at all believe that the *Prince of Orange* would attack them, and yet for all their confidence, they could find no other remedy than to betake themselves to their heels. And this was the greatest and most famous,

mous action of the whole War. The third way to avoid fighting, is to shut your self up in some strong Town, which is the most pernicious way of all, as making your ruine inevitable. Therefore (as *Machiavel* says) to keep the Field, and avoid fighting, is to be done no way so securely as by keeping fifty miles off, and sending out store of Spies and Scouts that may give you notice of the Enemies approach, and opportunity to retreat.

Nor is it necessary to do all this, that your Army should be very numerous. The *Romans* and the *Greeks* always carried on their Wars with a few men, depending more upon their great order and the excellence of their Discipline, than great numbers; but the Eastern and Western Nations did all by their multitudes. *Alexander* conquered the world with 30000. men. *Pyrrhus* was wont to say that with 15000. men he would go through the world. And yet *Pyrrhus* fought against the *Romans*, and beat them in two Battels, and was in the judgment of *Hannibal* himself, one of the greatest Captains of the world. The ordinary *Roman* Army consisted of about 24000. men, and if they were at any time overpressed with numbers, they exceeded not 50000. with which number at one time they opposed 200000. *Gauls*, or, if you will, call them *Frenchmen*.

There are two Nations whose genius resembles that of the ancient *Romans*, the *Germans* and the *English*, who are descended from them. But there are these two differences between them: The *Germans* you shall never bring up to make a point blank attack in the mouth of Cannons, in such fashion as the *English*; nor again after a rout shall you hardly make them rally, as you may the *English*. From all these things I make this conclusion, That if the *French* renew the War again, the best way will be to oppose them with an Army of *English*, and by all means to force them to fight continually, till the Field be too hot for them, and when they can keep that no longer, their Towns will be of little service to them. The *English* have fought many Battels with the *French*, and always beaten them; and yet the *French* have exceeded them much in numbers: as in the memorable Battel of *Poitiers*, where the *English* were but about 8000. and the *French* were 60000.

And thus I come to the third and last part of my Discourse, the office whereof is to dispose into method, such arguments as will be necessary to

be used to the several parties, that is to say, the *King*, *Parliament*, and *this State*, to draw them on to such a *League*: and they are as followeth.

To the King.

1. It will serve to conciliate, and beget a better understanding between him and the Parliament, and to remove some part of that jealousy which the people travail with of the Kings administration, and which will never leave burning till it burn to the Foundations of the Throne if not prevented. And if it attains not the end of introducing other co-operative acts of concord, it will at least avert the hastening on of greater evils. There be some of those things which the Parliament would have, which the King would consent to, upon condition he might not be pressed in the rest, as the case of the *Duke of York*, &c. Therefore let them begin with some popular great thing that may involve the interests and affections of all.

2. As to that point of the confirmation by the Parliament, I have shewed the precedents of former times.

3. The Ratification here by the General Estates will be equipolent to the Ratification in *England* by the Parliament, which saves the Kings honour. For thus the parties rather conspire in one, how to render this League illustrious and great, than on their respective parts to be forced to any thing.

To the Parliament.

1. Let it move from themselves, that is, let some of those in the House of *Commons*, who are of unquestionable reputation for Wisdom, Honesty and Integrity, be engaged; let them engage others; and let them communicate their Counsels with my Lord *Shaftsbury* and that *Party* in the House of *Lords*. Then let the Scheme and Project be proposed in the House of *Commons*, then the *Commons* seek the *Lords* concurrence; and then let it be offered to the *King*, as the advice of the whole *Kingdom*; for every man is there in person, or by representation.

2. This

2. This will shut up those *avenues*, those back doors, by which the *French* have had access to our Councils, and have influenced them. And consequently will render the sitting of Parliaments more calm and secure, when that mighty trade of theirs, of *buying Prerogations* shall be spoild, and their *Factions* rendered less malignant.

3. This is an infallible argument, As the end of a thing is, so is the thing. The two general ends of this *League* are; To preserve the Protestant Religion; and to preserve and restore the Ballance of Europe, by lessening the power of *France*. And those are the two greatest ends in Christendom; therefore that thing that has those for its ends is the greatest thing: and the minds of gallant men are exceedingly moved with great things, and strongly carried to the pursuit of them.

To this State.

1. The first argument is prudential. Prudence is that virtue, by which, when several things are offered, we are directed which to chuse, and which to refuse; what to do, and what not to do. *Holland* then must either make a League with *France*, or with *England*, or remain Neuter.

To make a League with *France* is utterly imprudent, for these two reasons.

1. Because *France* aiming at and designing an *Universal Monarchy*, would only secure himself of them, till their own turn come, that is, till he hath swallowed up the *Spanish Netherlands and Germany*, when he would turn his Force upon them.

2. By such means they would lose the best and surest friend they have had from their Foundation of their State, and that is *England*. And where a *State* is not sufficient by its own proper force, in respect of the weakness of the same, or the mightiness of its Neighbours, to defend it self, it must of necessity rely some where els for protection.

To remain in a *neutral* condition cannot be. For so, instead of making one friend, they would make three enemies. And in case *France* should renew the war upon them, *England* would be won, upon such terms as *France* would offer, either to join with them, or to stand still, and see

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Holland ruined. Besides how impolitic a thing *neutrality* is, any man may see that will consider the observations made there on. *Mach. Prince* cap. 21.

It remains then, and I know nothing else that remains, *To make a League with England.* For that will have one of two effects. Either *France* will be wholly deterred from attempting upon their *State*; or if he does they will be able with the assistance of *England* to defend themselves. This is the first *Argument*.

2. The authority and reputation of the *Proposers*; It is a *League* proposed by the *Parliament of England*, to be entered into with the *King and Kingdom of England*. The *Parliament* represents the whole people of *England*; and commands both the parts and persons of a great, rich and valiant nation, from whom neither money nor souldiers will be wanting to beat down the power of that proud & insulting nation of *France*. But these people here are afraid of *France*, why then, let them make a league with those of whom *France* it self is afraid. And withal let them remember this *League* is to be made with a People, from whom they have received the greatest benefits, as I have shewed before. And this argument alone will beat down the most, if not all the objections that would arise against such a *League*, proposed in any other manner.

3. The great reputation and security such a *League* will give to this *State*, which will cover them as with wings of Protection against *France*, and whosoever else would prey upon them.

If I have not expressed these things so as I would, I have done it so well as I can in a short time. And so submitting it with all decent humility, to the grave Considerations of those excellent personages whom it may most concern, I leave it to its *Fate*.

Hague. May 14. 80.

FINIS.